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Abstract
How is the generation of a grammatical sentence implemented by the human
brain? A starting place for such an inquiry lies in linguistic theory. Unfortu-
nately, linguistic theories illuminate only abstract knowledge representations
and do not indicate how these representations interact with cognitive architec-
ture to produce discourse. We examine tightly constrained empirical methods
to study how grammar interacts with one part of the cognitive architecture,
namely attention. Finally, we show that understanding attention as a neural
network can link grammatical choice to underlying brain systems. Overall,
our commentary supports a multilevel empirical approach that clarifies and
expands the connections between cognitive science and linguistics thus ad-
vancing the interdisciplinary agenda outlined by Jackendoff.
1. Introduction
In his Aspects (Chomsky 1965: 3) Chomsky argues that his ideal speaker-
listener must be “unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as
memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest . . .” This view
underlies the common distinction made in linguistics between competence and
performance models of language processing.
Generativism is content to develop competence models in isolation from
the basic psychological and neurological systems, i.e., memory and attention.
Since the early writings of Chomsky, factors like memory limitations and shifts
of attention have been consigned to performance, something with which a the-
ory of competence should not be concerned.
In his new book, Jackendoff suggests a dramatically updated version of gen-
erative theory. First, he emphasizes the importance of studies that inquire into
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major aspects of performance, such as, sentence production and comprehen-
sion. Second, Jackendoff refuses to conform to a clear-cut border between com-
petence and performance: although continuing to maintain the competence-
performance opposition, he seeks a better integration of performance factors
into competence theory. This permits a soft distinction between the two al-
lowing for performance theories to provide insight into our understanding of
grammatical competence.
In this article we attempt to advance the general goals outlined by Jackendoff
by reviewing how the progress that has taken place in cognitive neuroscience
during the past several years can advance a functional linguistics which puts
linguistic competence upon a foundation of cognitive and neural mechanisms.
In Section 2 (Linguistic Theory) we map grammar onto knowledge representa-
tions (see Figure 1). We argue that in order to function, knowledge representa-
tions must work in conjunction with the cognitive architecture in order to pro-
duce language output. In Section 3 (Attention and Grammar of Discourse), we
show how the choice of a grammatical device in the narrative can depend upon
a portion of the cognitive architecture, namely attention. In the final section
(Attentional Networks), we discuss how attention, as a feature of the cognitive
architecture, can be illuminated by a further understanding of how it devel-
ops under the influence of genes and experience. In the concluding section we
argue that our findings with respect to the influence of attention on grammar
may be generalized to advance the links between linguistics and cognitive sci-
ence.
2. Linguistic theory
Linguistic theory makes its best contribution to cognitive science when its the-
oretical framework and empirical findings capture thoroughly the extensive
variation found in human languages and language use, and when its efforts
to do so are constrained by an understanding of the architecture and associated
processing systems through which language is embodied in human cognition.
Chomsky (1988) articulates four key problems for linguistics and linguistic
theory (see Figure 1): (1) knowledge of the grammar (KNOWLEDGE REPRE-
SENTATIONS); (2) acquisition of that knowledge (ACQUISITION); (3) use of
that knowledge (USE), and, most recently, (4) how that knowledge is tied to the
brain that implements it (ARCHITECTURE). Another problem, not so explicitly
articulated, though also central, is the discovery of what it is about human lan-
guage that makes it so uniquely human, something no other species remotely
shares with us (Hauser et al. 2002).
Of these four central problems, two have dominated research within the gen-
erative tradition – both the continuing tradition following closely the work of
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Knowledge
Representations:
USE:
How linguistic knowledge is
used
ACQUISITION:
How the child acquires lan-
guage
ARCHITECTURE:
The representation of linguistic
knowledge in the brain
Figure 1. Four central questions of linguistic theory
Chomsky and related scholars and derivative approaches: (1) representations
of the knowledge of the grammar, especially syntax, focused on the problem
of constraining the notion of a possible sentence; and (2) initial acquisition
of those representations by the child, with some attention to the interaction of
these two problems.
Two principal commitments accompany these basic problems. The first com-
mitment is to the construction of a structuralist theory wherein the essential
character of human language is imagined to be captured primarily, if not exclu-
sively, as constraints on the configuration of abstract structural units of one kind
or another. The second commitment is to method, and there is a fundamental
method deployed in linguistic research: introspection on the well-formedness
of utterances. Grammaticality judgments remain the principal methodological
tool, though other methods are occasionally entertained, mostly through refer-
ence to work outside linguistics itself.
The union of the two principal questions (KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATIONS
and ACQUISITION) with commitments to structuralist theory and introspective
method invites, at least in practice, the creation of increasingly abstract the-
ory divorced from the messy data of human experience. Variation is treated
generally as noise in the system, largely ignored as the theory is constructed,
or, explained away as artefacts of processes external to language, assigned to
irrelevance as part of performance.
It is worthwhile to recall what aspects of linguistic behaviour are attributed to
performance by traditional generative theory. These things are “. . . such gram-
matically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of
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attention and interest, and errors . . .”(Chomsky 1965: 3). In classical Chom-
skian view these factors should not concern a theory of linguistic competence,
as they are too heterogeneous.
We cannot subscribe to the view that these factors are not necessary to an-
alyze if one seeks to establish a viable theory of language. Language exists
and develops largely in the performance mode. The theory of linguistic com-
petence either needs to seek to account for performance variation or try to rule
performance factors out – it cannot just discard them as unnecessary.
On the other hand there exists a strong psycholinguistic tradition of study-
ing regularities in grammar by analyzing effects of memory limitations on the
choice of grammatical forms (i.e., Sanford and Garrod 1981, 1994; van Dijk
and Kintsch 1983; Just and Carpenter 1992), contributions of attention to the
organization of speech grammar (see Section 2), and speech errors and repairs
(i.e., Garrett 1975; Dell 1986; Levelt 1989). Our general view can be positioned
within this tradition.
Any abstract theory of domain-specific knowledge imposes limitations that
can be appreciated through an example. Consider the case of a dog catching a
Frisbee thrown by its owner. The Frisbee does not travel in a straight line but
follows an arcing path through the air, and the dog typically also runs along a
curving path, timing its run and path to readily catch the disk. We could ask
about how the dog does this, what the knowledge representations of the paths
of the Frisbee and the dog are like for the dog, and what the cognitive systems
are like that permit the dog to succeed regularly in coordinating its locomotion
with the flight path. One kind of theory, perfectly adequate in a descriptive
sense, would look at the mathematics of the flight path of the Frisbee and assert
that this mathematics represents the knowledge the dog must have of the flight
path of the Frisbee. Such a theory does not, of course, claim that the actual
knowledge in the mind of the dog is in fact the same kind of representation
that one uses for the mathematical model, but it does ask that we explore the
dog’s abilities as if its knowledge representations were of that kind. And the
corresponding research agenda one might develop to investigate how the dog
catches the Frisbee will be constrained by this theory.
First, it constrains the way in which research problems are conceptualized
to begin with, requiring them to conform to the representational imaginings
of the theory, even though the theory may well grant that it does not approxi-
mate well the pertinent knowledge representations in the cognizer, the dog in
this example. Second, it constrains in a corresponding fashion the invention
and adaptation of methods for empirical study since what you can see empiri-
cally is systematically related to what you can conceptualize theoretically. An
alternative theory, one in which the nature of knowledge representations ap-
proximates or mimics what we have learned about knowledge representations
in cognition more generally, is in our view to be preferred (even with accompa-
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nying empirical limitations) to one that lacks coherent connection to the details
of architecture and the nature of accompanying processing systems.
This view leads to revision of the traditional competence-performance dis-
tinction. In its original formulation, the commitment to competence permitted
one to see, for example, that embedding of clauses with verbs like believe is
infinitely recursive, despite limitations in memory that make more than three
or four embeddings unlikely in actual performance. In this case limitations in
memory are appropriately set aside as not directly relevant to the grammar of
English. Nonetheless, not all matters involving cognitive operations of memory
or attention sit so readily outside the grammar. As we discuss in more detail
below, the cognitive conditions associated with the assignment of referents to a
subject in English (reflected in its voice system), in particular attention, appear
to constrain directly the use of linguistic structures during language produc-
tion. Such constraints, grounded in central cognitive and neurological systems,
capture another type of linguistic competence, one in which the mapping be-
tween linguistic form and semantic or conceptual representation is tied to the
nature of the cognitive systems defined by fundamental human cognitive archi-
tecture.
In the end, the noise, more properly the variation, does not go away; it re-
mains to be explained. Among linguists, accounting for the “noise” of linguis-
tic performance is tied in increasingly interesting and compelling ways to the
other central questions for the field: USE and ARCHITECTURE.
There is, of course, a great deal of work on acquisition framed in terms of its
constraint by ideas about the nature of knowledge representations for language,
the so-called logical problem of language acquisition. But there is also a con-
siderable body of work that examines the social and cognitive processes that
implement acquisition, and such work pursues the details of dynamic change.
This agenda of research on acquisition defined by scholars such as Slobin,
Tomasello, Bates and MacWhinney, Bowerman, and others aims at understand-
ing how language emerges from the details of social interaction and cognitive
development.
Being an important source of variation, language use permits regular map-
pings of the semantic and pragmatic details of a grammar onto its system of
forms. In general, languages offer structurally distinct ways of conveying es-
sentially identical messages: variation in referential form, variation in voice
and related systems, variation in constituent orders, variation in complementa-
tion and its relation to the packaging of events, and even individual morphemes
whose use remains elusive (Japanese wa, for instance). Such problems, defined
by scholars like, Givón, Chafe, Bates and MacWhinney, Kintsch and van Dijk,
Langacker, Talmy, and Dik, have stimulated some linguists to seek the cogni-
tive bases for the semantic and pragmatic notions whose prior theoretical status
was grounded in structuralist theory and introspective methodology.
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Language variation poses considerable challenges to linguistic theory, espe-
cially as one brings cognition into the descriptive and explanatory game. Lin-
guistic theory has tended to downplay the issues related to language use, both
in their own right and in their potential to contribute to a comprehensive theory
of human language behaviour. Within the mainstream, variation is treated as
mere performance and not part of the central endeavour, something to be left
to psychology or sociology to deal with.
Thus, while the classic competence/performance distinction is intended to
constrain the enterprise of developing linguistic theory, it has in fact limited
it. In parallel with its commitment to abstract representations of linguistic
knowledge, the conventional idea of competence and performance embraces an
overly simplistic notion of the target of investigation, the nature of the gram-
mar of the speaker. The distinction is initially helpful, in that it directs the
focus of research to the ability of the speaker to create well-formed utterances
without undue attention to certain vagaries of production – slips of the tongue,
forgetting, and such, though these need not be seen as random and irrelevant to
understanding human language. However, it also invites one to conclude mis-
takenly that the grammar of a speaker is somehow a relatively fixed system
of constitutive rules in which all variation arises out of one or another kind
of (mere) performance failure. It invites the nativist argument, drawn straight
out of Plato’s Meno, that since the end product is fixed and complete, the sys-
tem must already be essentially in place a priori and that language input in
the social environment plays a relatively minor role in acquisition since that
input is limited and “flawed”. It also permits the trivialization of use and con-
comitant issues of language processing, relegating those issues to the “parser”,
lower level systems that manage the details of implementation of the abstract
grammar.
In the end, it is the speaker’s competence that must be described, but the
details of that competence must go beyond those associated with the idea of an
ideal speaker-hearer without limitations of memory and such. Human gram-
mars operate with components that reflect precisely those cognitive processes
tied to mapping non-linguistic representations into language. Voice systems –
active vs. passive in English, but more complex systems in other languages
(Tagalog, for example) – likely reflect the interaction of processes of attention
with syntactic form, selecting some information as more salient or relevant to
some task at hand. The selection of referential form – pronominal vs. nominal
NPs, and these latter sub-categorized by the complexity of the modifications
of the head – likely reflects something of the management of the elements in
memory by the speaker and hearer. Systems without the internal need for di-
recting of attention or sustaining or renewing a mental representation – for
example, any typical desktop computer – do not need languages with voice or
fine-grained systems of nominal reference. These complexities arise from the
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characteristics of human cognition, and language does not shunt these matters
off to performance nor should linguistic theory.
In the end, the aspects of language related to its PERFORMANCE require
dealing with the results of language USE - variation. While the principal the-
oretical structures and methods that linguists use in dealing with variation in-
clude structuralist categories and argumentation, the study of variation in USE
requires additional exploratory methods. These methods, whether drawn from
chronometric and experimental protocols of psychology or from the potential
of neuroimaging, will re-shape linguistic theory.
In the next section, we will discuss how linguistic performance may expe-
rience systematic constraints imposed by cognitive architecture. More specif-
ically, we will review experimental evidence for the idea that a part of the ar-
chitecture (attentional system) may influence the language grammar in course
of speech production and comprehension.
3. Attention and the grammar of discourse
When people talk they need to properly organize semantic and syntactic struc-
ture of their narratives in order to facilitate communication. A part of this pro-
cess is being able to identify, track, and bind concepts in the discourse. A sig-
nificant body of experimental work suggests that mechanisms of attentional
control are actively involved in various aspects of human discourse.
Traditional definitions of attention have been subjective, for example Wil-
liam James defined attention as “taking possession by the mind, in clear and
vivid form, of one out of what seems several simultaneously possible objects
or trains of thought” (James 1890: 403–404). More recently it has become
possible to examine attention in terms of specific mechanisms that maintain the
alert state, orient to sensory events, and mediate between conflicting responses
(Posner and Dehaene 1994). This allows identification of the neural networks
that underlie attention (see Section 4).
Psycholinguistic research connects at least these three areas of language pro-
cessing to attention:
(A) ordering of constituents in discourse production;
(B) disambiguation of syntactic structure in comprehension of discourse;
(C) choice of the expression to refer to the entities previously mentioned in
discourse.
Readers interested in the research in (B) are referred to recent reviews (Tanen-
haus and Trueswell 2004; Tanenhaus et al. 2004; Altman and Kamide 2004),
while summary of the research in (C) may be found in (Stevenson 1996; Gar-
nham 1987; 1999; Myachykov and Posner 2005). In the remaining part of this
section we will concentrate on the evidence for non-arbitrary ordering of con-
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stituents in the sentence as a result of unequal allocation of attention toward
the entities the sentence concerns.
The idea that assignment of syntactic roles in a clause may be due to the
salience of the entities being described and, therefore, to the speaker’s atten-
tional focus has a long tradition. In some early experiments, researchers primed
either agent or patient by manipulating their salience, thus eliciting voice alter-
nations in subsequent sentence-picture verification or sentence recall tasks. For
example, Johnson-Laird (1968) showed that subjects preferred large and more
salient referent points to small ones in verifying pictures and their possible de-
scriptions. Turner and Rommetveit (1968) manipulated focus of attention by
priming either agent of patient of the picture during the storing and retriev-
ing sentences. They discovered that this manipulation influenced the voice, in
which the sentences were recalled. Tannenbaum and Williams (1968) attracted
attentional focus to the agent or the patient by presenting subjects with either an
agent-laden or patient-laden text. This, respectively, facilitated active or passive
voice descriptions of a picture, presented afterwards. Olson and Filby (1972)
primed subjects’ attention by showing a picture of either the agent or the pa-
tient of a transitive event before presenting the picture of the event itself. In
subsequent sentence-picture verification task, subjects interpreted the pictures
and the sentences by starting with an attended protagonist and applying gram-
matical voice from that perspective.
Reports by R. Tomlin (1995, 1997) suggested arguably the strongest support
for the idea that orienting of attention influences syntactic structure in speech
production. Tomlin designed a computer animation program called the “Fish
Film” (Figure 2). Subjects viewed and described an unfolding engagement of
the two fish in real time. In each trial one of the two fish was visually cued
(arrow in Figure 2). The cue attracted the subjects’ attention (Posner 1980).
The critical part of each trial was eating of one of the fish by the other (dynamic
event). The descriptions of the dynamic event became the target utterances for
further analysis.
English speakers varied assignment of the syntactic subject depending on the
visual cue (Tomlin 1995). When the patient fish was cued and was then eaten
by the agent fish the subjects said, “the dark fish was eaten by the light fish”.
When the agent fish was cued the same event was described as “the light fish
ate the dark fish”. Attention to the cue influenced the choice of the syntactic
subject of the sentence and the choice of grammatical voice that mapped onto
this assignment.
One recent study (Nappa et al. in press) further supported this finding. In this
study, attention was manipulated covertly: it was captured via a brief presenta-
tion of black target stimulus against a white background immediately prior to
the scene viewing. Eye movements were tracked as indication of the success of
attentional cueing (Fischer 1998). Two types of scenes were described: (1) ones
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Figure 2. The fish film
eliciting a conjoined noun phrase (CNP) and (2) ones requiring use of a per-
spective verb (i.e., give/receive). Analysis of collected utterances suggested
that the primed character was likely (1) to appear first in CNP utterances and
(2) to be a subject of Perspective verb utterances. The former result provides
support to the thesis that the order of mentioning may influence consecutive
choice of grammatical subject. The latter supports the idea that the allocation
of attention influences assignment of the grammatical subject.
Eye movements and fixations have also been observed to precede word pro-
duction (Meyer et al. 1998; Levelt and Meyer 2000; van der Muelen et al.
2001). It was also observed that name-related gazes reflect locus of attention
but not semantic information contained in the scene (Griffin 2004). These re-
sults provide important support for the thesis that attention is actively employed
in lexical access as well as in the organization of syntactic structure.
Manipulations of attention were also used to study the assignment of the
grammatical subject and the choice of specific lexical item in production and
verification of locatives. For example, Clark and Chase (1972) presented sub-
jects with a picture of an asterisk either above or below a plus. The sentence
accompanying the picture might, for instance, read “star is below plus”. In
Experiment 3, subjects were directly instructed to attend to either (1) whole
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Figure 3. Example of the experimental sequence from Forrest (1997)
picture, or (2) the top of it, or (3) the bottom before comparing the sentences
to their pictorial counterparts. The results supported the idea that subjects an-
chored their attention depending on above or below indices: directing attention
to either above or below facilitated verification of the relevant locative descrip-
tions.
L. Forrest (1997) used a similar approach in a production study. She ma-
nipulated subjects’ attention to one of quadrants of the display with the help
of a visual cue, then presented visual array of objects, which was followed by
a mask, and collected the descriptions of the observed scene. The location of
the cue influenced the resulting narrative in a fashion similar to Tomlin’s (see
Figure 3).
The reports discussed so far seem to have demonstrated that the choice of
syntactic subject position might result from the direction of attention. How-
ever, one of the criticisms to such accounts is their reliance on English syntax,
which is known for its relative rigidity: it suggests binary variation of word
order based on the alternation between active and passive grammatical voice.
Languages with more combinatorial freedom might not demonstrate a direct
correlation between assignment of the syntactic subject and allocation of at-
tention. It may also be that interaction between a visual cueing scheme and
the choice of syntactic pattern might be revealed differently in languages other
than English.
In order to test latter assumptions, the Fish Film protocol was applied to
the analysis of Russian utterances (Myachykov and Tomlin in preparation).
Russian is characterized by a flexible ordering of constituents with a default
higher-frequency pattern – SVO. As in other flexible word order languages,
the first position in a Russian sentence does not necessarily imply that this
position is assigned to the grammatical subject. Such a grammar permits, at
least in theory, other possible combinations, such as OVS, OSV, or even verb-
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initial sequences like VSO. Functional theories of Russian word order repeat-
edly suggested that the clause-level theme (the topical, background, or presup-
posed information) should enter the sentence first. The rheme (the comment,
foreground, or new information) should follow the theme (i.e., Adamec 1966;
Krylova and Khavronina 1988; King 1995).
The association between theme and initial slot in the sentence provides a
solid theoretical prediction for Fish Film experiment: Russian word order
should map onto the cueing scheme so that the trials, in which the cued el-
ement is the agent should be covered by agent-first utterances (SVO, SOV)
while the patient-cued trials should be described by the utterances with patient
in the initial position (OVS, passive voice).
In conflict with this prediction, native Russian speakers preferred agent-first
patterns (predominantly SVO) to all other available sequences regardless of
the cueing. This preference, however, entailed some notable implications: (1)
in the utterances that started with the agent regardless of the fact that the patient
fish was cued there was a hidden attentional switch: the speech on-set latencies
(SOL) were significantly longer (ca. 202 msec) in the agent-first utterances that
were elicited when the cued element was the patient fish; (2) the latter group
of utterances was characterized by a significantly higher speech error rate: sub-
jects experienced difficulties defining which case marker they needed to attach
in order to produce the correct sentence.
These results show that underlying the grammatical choice there is an atten-
tional component that works similarly irrespective of the language involved.
The surface utterances differ in syntactic form between languages, but the
mechanism of attention works very similarly. In English attention stays on the
cued item and the syntax varies between active and passive forms, but in Rus-
sian, presumably because use of one word order is more frequent and because
of necessity to choose a proper case marker, which increases operational load,
there is a hidden switch to maintain attention the same over syntax.
The patterns of interaction between attention and the language device in
the two languages are nevertheless different. The correspondence between the
grammatical subject and the attentionally detected entity in English is estab-
lished consistently while Russian speakers choose to stick to an agent-driven
word order. The difference in our view is in the ways attention interfaces with
the syntactic structure of the narrative in the two languages. The interface for
English might be attend____then____assign subject. We expected to see the
principle attend___then___assign theme at work in Russian. This principle
should have resulted in the subject-first/object-first choice of word order de-
pending on which of the referents, agent or patient, was cued. However, the
way attention interacts with language in Russian does not permit this corre-
spondence: the subjects choose to switch their attention from the cued to the
non-cued referent in order to arrive at the preferred word order. Hence, syntac-
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tic convenience seems to overrule attention: despite cueing of other thematic
roles in the sentence, the subject in Russian sentence is preferably placed first.
This shows that a frequent usage of a particular pattern can override attention
cueing. That in effect suggests that formal properties of language can be in
conflict with cognitive processing.
The difference in attention-language interface observed in the two languages
is well accounted for in Slobin’s thinking for speaking theory (Slobin 1987).
In this view, the process of thinking for speaking involves choosing specific
characteristics of the event that (a) fit its conceptualization and (b) are readily
encodable in the language (Slobin 1987: 435). A more codable expression is
more accessible in psycholinguistic terms. Much in accordance with our view,
thinking for speaking assumes a non-arbitrary pattern of interaction between
thought and language triggered by the linguistic code. In the context of Russian
language, and in on-line format, preference in word order triggers a shift of
attention from one referent to the other in order to facilitate speech.
Although these conclusions are by no means final, and we admit that our
evidence is limited to a small number of studies, these data demonstrate how
patterns automated in the language may define interface between the cognitive
system and the language device.
The experimental findings we examined in Section 3 converge in their sup-
port of the idea that linguistic competence and performance are intrinsically
interrelated and interdependent forms of language existence. We demonstrated
how one part of the cognitive architecture, namely attention, interacts with
grammar. This interaction illustrates how the cognitive system imposes reg-
ular constraints on language. Similarly, the language grammar may reciprocate
this influence. The effects of the latter interaction are difficult to trace in off-
line linguistic data, as these effects probably do not continue outside real time
speech format. Analysis of on-line speech in some languages (Russian) made it
possible to demonstrate how automated grammatical patterns may trigger spe-
cific changes in the ways cognitive system (attention) functions. This provides
important insight into the internal organization of the interfaces between dif-
ferent languages and the cognitive architecture. The next section will take the
view we advocate here into the nearest future: we will be analyzing recent evi-
dence from the fields of neuroscience and psychogenomics that connects brain
networks related to attention and language processing to the genes contributing
to their development and functioning.
4. Developing brain networks
Of what use is it to know that attention is involved in comprehension and pro-
duction of discourse? As long as attention was an entirely subjective concept it
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was probably not particularly useful for linguistics to posit “attention” as im-
portant in the development of syntax. However, the orienting network discussed
in the last section is now known to involve several parietal sites (Corbetta and
Shulman 2002) and to be influenced by cholinergic input from frontal areas
(Davidson and Marrocco 2002). These findings help link the neural networks
involved in language, which are known from imaging studies, to those driving
the attentional influences on grammar discussed in Section 3.
Because both humans and alert monkeys have similar attentional orienting
systems, it is possible to compare cellular recordings from indwelling elec-
trodes in monkeys with scalp recordings from humans to obtain the time course
for the activation of these anatomical areas (Abdullaev and Posner 1998; Cor-
betta and Shulman 2002). These studies provide the opportunity to validate the
time course for operations in eye movement studies with time for internal op-
erations in the brain. For example, eye movement studies of reading suggest
that fixation times for skilled readers on a particular word are about 275 mil-
liseconds. Because the length and direction of the saccade can reflect semantic
information obtained from that word, there is a limited time to derive semantics
from the input word. Evidence from brain imaging suggests that frontal areas
involved in attention to semantics can be activated within about 150 msec. after
input, time enough to influence the saccade length (Posner et al. 1999).
It is also possible to go from an understanding of attentional networks to
some knowledge of how genes influence their development. The method of
doing this may be instructive for understanding critical aspects of determin-
ing how genes influence language. While there is strong evidence of common
networks that underlie cognitive processes, there are also differences among in-
dividuals. These differences are likely to reflect both genes and experience. The
rapid development of fMRI methods has begun to provide a basis for under-
standing differences among individual brains both anatomically and in terms
of functional activations, these differences are to be expected because people
are not identical in their thoughts, feelings or behaviors.
It is possible to begin the process of finding the genes responsible for the
development of particular networks by examining phenotypic differences in
people. In the case of attention, we developed the Attention Network Test as a
measure of the efficiency of each of the attention networks (Fan et al. 2002). It
is then possible to obtain rough guides to the genetic involvement of the task by
running twin studies (Fan et al. 2001). The executive attention network, known
to involve the anterior cingulate and other frontal areas, was shown to have a
high heritability; that is, there was a much higher correlation among identical
twins than fraternal twins, thus suggesting a role for genes. Since the areas of
the brain involved in this network are primarily modulated by dopamine, we
looked for variability among people in several dopaminergic genes. We found
several polymorphisms (differences in genes) that are related specifically to
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performance in the executive network (Fossella et al. 2002). When some of our
subjects were scanned during administration of the Attention Network Test,
we found the expected effects of genetic differences between subjects in the
anterior cingulate, which is one of the primary nodes of the executive network
(Fan et al. 2003).
How might this approach be used to illuminate questions of language? The
study of genes related to language has most often been through examination of
disorders (Lai et al. 2001; Bishop 2002). These may give insight into the evo-
lution of language. However, other methods may be useful as well. Chomsky
has proposed an innate language device central to the unique aspects of hu-
man grammar namely recursion (Hauser et al. 2002). In his book, Jackendoff
tries to develop an evolutionary account that would allow natural selection to
produce such a device. In turn, we propose a complementary approach based
on our attention findings that could lead to an evolutionary account of normal
variation in language use at the molecular level.
Suppose one believes at the core of grammar (e.g., recursion) there is an
innate language device specified in the human genome. Is it possible that per-
formance studies could help us understand this device? An important step is to
develop a reliable test of recursion that can be studied systematically among a
large set of people. Since no single test might capture all of the critical prop-
erties of recursion, a battery of tests might be needed. Studying a set of people
with such a test battery could then produce reliable individual differences in
carrying out recursion even though all the people would have knowledge of
the grammar of their language. These individuals would be genotyped for a
number of genes that might be related to grammatical skill.
Which genes would be used? Currently, many groups have been examining
candidate genes in abnormalities of language (Liu et al. 2001; Bishop 2002;
Enard et al. 2002) and in related disorders such as dyslexia (Grigorenko 2003).
These studies provide leads as to what genes may be involved. Of course, as in
all empirical efforts, there is no guarantee that any single gene or combination
of genes will be found to predict individual differences in recursion.
However, it is clear from the plan we outlined above that there is at least a
possible empirical agenda to study in detail the nature of the innate linguistic
device underlying grammar. This agenda has been successful in finding specific
genes that influence complex networks in attention and memory (see Goldberg
and Weinberger 2004). Success in these human studies could allow one to trace
some of the elements of recursion in rodents and primates thus providing the
basis for a comparative study of the elements of syntax at the molecular level.
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5. Conclusions
In our article we have sought to advance the agenda proposed by Jackendoff
by illustrating how one cognitive system, attention, interacts with language.
We discussed important empirical findings, which are based upon combining
empirical methods from cognitive psychology, such as reaction time and eye
movements, along with neuroimaging and genetics research that is develop-
ing in cognitive neuroscience. These methods seem to allow an opportunity to
examine the mechanisms of language comprehension and production at cogni-
tive, neural and genetic levels and thus advance the productive interdisciplinary
approach. In general, we tried to emphasize that the key to understanding how
the mind works can be found in studying language, especially in studying per-
formance tasks of language.
Jackendoff proposed to treat competence and performance as modes of lan-
guage functioning with a much larger degree of permeability than traditionally
permitted in generative theory. This move is admirable as it allows genera-
tivism to adapt the idea of regular reciprocal interactions between knowledge
of language rules (competence) and regular instances of language use (perfor-
mance). However, we remind the reader that this claim is a new contribution
to the generative theory while psycholinguistics has been long producing evi-
dence for this idea. In our theoretical claims, we subscribed to the general pro-
posal that linguistic competence and performance are intrinsically interrelated
and interdependent forms of language existence. This, in effect, entails that the
cognitive architecture regularly interacts with knowledge representations in the
production of discourse.
We reviewed some experimental evidence that converge in their support of
this idea. We demonstrated how one part of the cognitive architecture, namely
attention interacts with grammar. This interaction illustrates how the cogni-
tive system imposes regular constraints on language. Similarly, the language
grammar may reciprocate this influence. The effects of the latter interaction
are difficult to trace in off-line linguistic data, as these effects probably do not
continue outside real time speech format. Analysis of on-line speech in some
languages (Russian) made it possible to demonstrate how automated grammat-
ical patterns may trigger specific changes in the ways cognitive system (atten-
tion) functions. This provides important insight into internal organization of
the interfaces between different languages and the cognitive architecture.
In the final section we reviewed an ambitious agenda of trying to under-
stand attentional influence on language at the level of development of brain
networks. Of course we do not know the outcome of such studies, but it seems
entirely possible that they would yield detailed information about the innate
language learning device that would illuminate questions about its anatomy,
development and why individuals differ in their ability to acquire language. If
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so, even those holding most strongly to the idea that language is unique might
embrace an empirical approach to unraveling its underlying substrate. Based
on studies of attention and memory, we propose a strategy for seeing which
genes influence the development of grammar.
University of Glasgow
University of Oregon
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